science, much as therapists assume that they are merely following the rules of a therapeutic technique. Still, neither set of rules was created ex nihilo. They both originated from assumptions that still guide, however implicitly, the "rules," and thus the application of the methods. The formulation of any method must assume, before any investigation, a certain type of world in which that method would make sense and be fruitful.
The problem is that when these assumptions are already assumed to be correct (as they must be for any method to be formulated or applied), they are not themselves the objects of test; they are parts of the test itself. For instance, the notion that methods should be observable is never itself empirically tested, because this notion is part of what it means to test. Indeed, the doctrine of observability is not itself empirically testable because this doctrine is not itself observable. It is part of a philosophy, or more specifically, an epistemology. Some might claim that this epistemology has been successful. However, it must be remembered that this claim of success is merely a claim -an opinion -however widely it is held. No scientific evidence can be gathered to substantiate this claim without already assuming the validity of the scientific method in the first place. For this reason, natural science methods may provide empirical justification for certain psychological theories, but they provide no empirical justification for themselves and the epistemological and ontological assumptions that ground them.
What, then, is the unproven philosophy that underlies these natural science methods?
Given the influence of naturalism in psychology's historical origins, could naturalism be involved in the implicit philosophy of science that is currently guiding both the formulation and application of psychology's research methods? As Dr. Nelson's paper argues and many observers and historians of psychology seem to agree (Collins, 1977; Griffin, 2000; Honer & Naturalistic Biases in Psychology 13 Hunt, 1987; Leahey, 1991; Viney & King, 1998) , an important part of the philosophy underlying the natural science methods of psychology is ontological naturalism.
As we will see, however, the situation concerning research methods is more complex than that of therapeutic technique (above). Many historians and philosophers separate ontological from methodological naturalism (cf. Davis & Collins, 2002) , with the latter supposedly devoid of many of the problematic assumptions of the former (Plantinga, 1997).
Nelson (this issue) described in his article how these scholars allow for the possibility that many research methods are nonreductively naturalistic in ways that permit theological neutrality.
Ontological naturalism, on the other hand, is commonly viewed as reductive, and thus atheistic, naturalism. As Griffin (2000) notes, "The atheism of this worldview, besides denying any transcendent source of religious experiences, combines with the reductionism to rule out the idea of a divine creation of the world and even any divine influence in the world" (p. 14).
Griffin (2000) , as it happens, is one of the few to explicitly describe a nonreductive naturalism that he believes is compatible with such a "divine influence," including theism. 1 Space limitations prohibit an explanation of its postmodern (Whiteheadian) philosophical tenets here. However, we should note that variations on these tenets have important method implications, because many interpretive researchers claim nonreductive forms of naturalism (Bohman, 1993; Gadamer, 1975; Ricoeur, 1981) . Could some form of nonreductive naturalism also undergird the natural science methods of the psychology of religion? Our focus on research methods makes this question especially relevant because many psychological scientists have presumed that the naturalism of their methods is essentially nonreductive, and thus essentially neutral to theological claims. Therefore, it is important to know whether the assumptions of psychology's mainstream methods are reductively or nonreductively naturalistic.
Reductive Versus Nonreductive Naturalism
To address this issue, Slife (2005) has reviewed key practices of mainstream psychological researchers to examine whether they are underlain with the assumptions of reductive naturalism. We adapt this review to the issue of theism and the psychology of religion here. Specifically, assumptions that Griffin and others have identified as reductively naturalistic are here examined in three categories: objectivism, materialism, and reductionism. 2 To help illuminate these reductive assumptions and their practical implications, we contrast traditional method practices to the practices of interpretive researchers that are widely acknowledged to be nonreductive (e.g., Gadamer, 1975; Packer & Addison, 1989) . This comparison should help to resolve the issue of whether psychology's investigative methods are truly underlain with and guided by ontological naturalism.
Objectivism. The first category of ontological naturalism is objectivism. In its most basic form, naturalistic objectivism is the study of "objects" that are external to the observer's mind. In other words, the ultimate subject matter of natural science methods is not subjectivitythe mental world of opinion, biases, values, and feelings. The subject matter is the objective world that presumably occurs outside our subjectivity -the natural world in its pristine formand thus the world without values, including our religious values (Evans, 1989; Ruse, 1982; Slife, 2004) . This dualism is an assumption of ontological naturalism that helps researchers 2 These categories also compare favorably to Ruse's (1982) definition of naturalistic science: repeatable, merely natural, and governed by natural law. In addition, these categories are similar to, in Plantinga's (1997) words, the "metaphysical assumptions that divide" ontological naturalism from "methodological neutralism," including the assumptions "that human beings are material objects," "dualism," and the "deterministic assumptions that seem to underlie much social science" (p. 11).
dismiss the activity of God in "objective" or "natural" events, because these events supposedly occur outside our subjectivity where religion supposedly resides.
Still, the question should be asked: what allows these ontological naturalists to think that researchers can get outside their "subjective" values to study these natural objects objectively?
As virtually all the texts on psychological research methods proclaim (e.g., Heiman, 1995), natural science methods are considered the chief tool for accomplishing this task because they work toward eliminating the biases and values of subjectivity, either through experimental control or precise measurement, or some combination of the two (Aiken, 2003; Jones, 1994; Haslam & McGarty, 2003) .
Consider for a moment the implications of this objectivism for researchers who are theistic. In their best methodological mindset, these researchers are working to eliminate their religious values. These values are not allowed to inform them about: what method design is best to use, how best to operationalize the constructs of the design, or even how to interpret their findings. From this aspect of reductive naturalism, these researchers are never permitted to call on what they consider the truth in conducting their studies. They are to follow, instead, the logic of these methods, which includes the elimination of any religious values and assumptions they might have. 3 Contrast this objectivist mindset to nonreductive, interpretive methods. Whereas values and biases are "bad" in natural science methods because they supposedly distort objective description and true knowledge, biases and values are considered not only inescapable in interpretive methods but also necessary to true understanding (Browning & Cooper, 2004; Gadamer, 1975; Packer & Addison, 1989; Slife, Smith, & Burchfield, 2003) . Mainstream religious experiences are either omitted entirely or considered secondary in conventional, reductive methods, when they are the primary focus in nonreductive methods. In this sense, the prevalent practices associated with observability and operationalization in mainstream psychological methods point to their clear materialist, and thus reductive, underpinnings.
Reductionism. Reductive naturalism also assumes that all change is ultimately reducible to, or governed by, unchangeable natural laws and principles (Griffin, 2000; Ruse, 1982; Slife, 2004) . Reduction implies, first, that everything is ultimately determined, with the unchanging controlling the changing. This reduction is, of course, the root of behavioral determinism, as discussed above. From a traditional behavioral perspective, the environment-behavior (S → R) relation is a lawfully governed relation, like any other in the natural (objective) world. This reduction also implies that these unchangeable and universal natural laws and principles are the most fundamental realities of the world (Griffin, 2000; Sanders, 1994; Slife & Williams, 1995) .
As a result, natural science methods have been formulated to detect these unchangeable and universal laws. The need for replication and repeatability in psychology is perhaps the most obvious manifestation of this formulation of the scientific method, because unchangeable natural laws should be detectable and repeatable (under the same conditions). As researchers of extrasensory perception (ESP) can attest, a lack of replicability is construed by psychologists as a lack Naturalistic Biases in Psychology 19 of real or ultimate existence (Reinsel, 1994) . Nonrepeatable religious phenomena would, of course, be treated similarly. Moreover, the importance of standardization and reliability in the psychology of religion (Murphy, 1990; Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 2003 ) also follows directly from the same need. Without replication, standardization, and reliability -as the naturalistic logic goes -research findings cannot reveal the ultimate realities of the world: reductive natural laws and principles.
Unfortunately, psychologists can boast of few natural (or social) laws, despite over a century of using these methods. Still, psychologists consider true knowledge to approximate this universality and unchangeability (Slife, 2004) . Reductionism has led psychologists to formulate their theories as if they were universal and unchangeable (e.g., theories of personality or memory), with the hope that these theories would one day be tested and found to be valid. Therefore, the aim of testing theoretical principles has guided the practices of most psychology of religion researchers and mainstream methodologists (Spilka, et al., 2003) . Reductionism has turned these practices away from the potentially changeable, lived experiences of religious people and turned them toward the replicable, standardizable, and reliable objective and material aspects of their sensory experiences.
As a contrast, consider that many interpretive methods require none of these reductive, unchangeable characteristics in their studies (Schwandt, 1994) . Rather than assuming that the most fundamental knowledge is universal and unchangeable (or generalizable) across individual contexts and situations, many interpretive researchers assume that at least some fundamental knowledge is inherent in the particular, and thus not all or even most contexts. Spiritual experiences, for example, are rarely meaningful without unique and particular contexts (James, 1902 (James, /1935 . Indeed, many interpretive researchers contend that pivotal aspects of individual Naturalistic Biases in Psychology 20 meanings also have contextually particular characteristics (Gadamer, 1975) . Hence, looking for the replicated, standardized, and reliable may prevent psychological researchers from understanding important aspects of religious experiences and practices. In this sense, the significance of these characteristics and practices for the natural science methods of psychology is a testament to the significance of the reductive naturalism that grounds them.
At this point, our comparison across the objectivist, materialist, and reductionist aspects of reductive naturalism should be sufficient to expose the ontologically naturalistic underpinnings of mainstream method practices, such as the elimination of biases (objectivism), the restriction to observables and operationalizations (materialism), and the necessity of replication and reliability (reductionism). If methodological naturalism was the intended grounding of these methods, it seems apparent at this juncture that ontological naturalism underlies this methodological naturalism -epistemology assumes ontology. After all, why would one ground a method in naturalism unless the method was meant to be successful in a naturalistic world?
Still, this comparison between reductive and nonreductive methods omits a central issue in the theism/naturalism controversy -the activity of God. Even if nonreductive, interpretive methods can include this divine activity, as some scholars have claimed (Griffin, 2000; James, 1902 James, /1935 Plantinga, 1997) , the fact is that they rarely do in psychology. These methods were formulated as if divine influences in the world (including scientific) events do not matter. If, however, a theistic worldview is correct, then psychological inquiry would be the most fruitful and successful when God's influences were taken into account. 4 A theistic method of this sort would also be helpful here because it could serve as another source of comparison. Similar to our comparison between the natural science and interpretive methods of psychology, it could potentially expose other problematic mainstream assumptions for the psychology of religion.
Unfortunately, we have found no such methods, inside or outside psychology. Even methods in the disciplines of religion and theology often do not formally assume God's activity in the performance of their procedures. 5 Therefore, in the absence of such a method, we propose to briefly outline one here. If we could conceive of a seriously theistic line of inquiry in which God's activity is necessary to conduct a valid investigation, we could better understand the naturalistic biases of mainstream psychological methods. What would such a seriously theistic method of inquiry be like?
Theistic Inquiry
Philosophers of science have often considered the scientific method to consist of two basic phases: the context of discovery and the context of justification. The context of discovery involves the generation of the ideas, hypotheses, and topics to be studied. This first phase has traditionally been quite open to even frankly religious explanations (Evans, 1989) . Brilliant ideas and insightful hypotheses have frequently been viewed unabashedly as "inspired" and even "a gift from God" (Slife & Richards, 2005, p. 10) . O'Grady & Richards (2005) surveyed theistic natural and behavioral scientists in the United States and found that the majority had no problem believing that God inspires scientists and researchers in this discovery phase of research and scholarship.
However, the context of justification -what most scientists consider to be the scientific method -is another matter entirely. This context involves the procedures or logic that scientists use to test the ideas generated in the context of discovery. As Christian philosopher C. Stephen assumes the existence of an ultimate truth, and thereby the notion that certain assumptions and values are bad and others are good.
For this reason, we would argue that the theist should be more interested in the negative responders. Scholars such as Alasdair MacIntyre (1981) , Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975 ), Charles Taylor (1989 ), and Paul Ricoeur (1981 describe a hermeneutic approach to knowledge advancement where assumptions and biases are unavoidable. However, they do not doom us to mere opinion or relativism. Microscopes and telescopes bias their viewers by the particular way in which they illuminate the phenomena of interest, but this bias does not mean the phenomena are not illuminated. Bias, in this sense, just means that there is no knowledge that escapes a particular slant. The obvious utility of traditional methods, from this perspective, stems not from their bias-free nature, but from their application of a useful bias -reductive naturalism.
So far, however, this positive approach to biases and assumptions seems to do little to free us from the captivity of our biases. How can we learn the truth of a phenomenon and not just our pre-conceptions of it? The answer from many hermeneuticists (e.g., Gadamer, 1975 ) is that we somehow intuit that the phenomenon we are studying is not sufficiently explicated (or illuminated) by our methods, and thus our biases and assumptions about the phenomenon. This intuition leads us to adjust our methods and assumptions to better or differently illuminate the phenomenon and then engage it again in study. This tacking back and forth between engaged study of the subject matter and clarifying reflection about the best assumptions (or methods) for studying it is often called the hermeneutic circle (Gadamer, 1975; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999) . 6 In this sense, we never escape our biases, but we can replace them with better biases.
The problem is that an important issue arises with this approach: How is this intuition and replacement possible? How can we sense the inadequacy of our assumptions or biases for the phenomenon at hand? These questions are important because there is considerable theoretical, scientific, and historical evidence that humans cling steadfastly to their biases and assumptions as dogmatic, opinionated self-deceivers. Regarding theoretical evidence, virtually every major theory of psychotherapy describes some mechanism whereby people routinely become stuck in their biases and beliefs, from Carl Jung to George Kelly to Aaron Beck (Beck, 1999; Rychlak, 1981) . Regarding empirical evidence, social science research is rife with studies indicating that we continually confirm our own biases, in our everyday lives and in our science (Nickerson, 1998) . We attend first to what fits our assumptions and often elaborate only what we already know (Rychlak, 1994) .
Historian and philosopher Thomas Kuhn (1970) called confirmation bias in science "normal science" because he believed it is the normal manner in which scientists proceed, solving the puzzles to which they already have answers. True paradigmatic change occurs only when the scientific community begins to sense the violation of their deepest assumptions and adjusts those assumptions accordingly. Although "paradigmatic change" has become a popular buzz term, Kuhn makes clear how truly rare this change occurs in science. Scientists constantly resist the recognition of assumption violations (research anomalies). Even when such violations or anomalies have been present for decades, they are often not "seen." Again, the question should be posed: Why would we ever, given these proclivities toward our own biases, notice their violation?
Those who have studied these violations label them variously, connoting their different philosophies. Gadamer (1975) labels it surplus of meaning; Ricoeur (1981) terms it affectivity;
